

Alexander Guggenberger

Contact Information

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Current Positions

Since 9/2021	PhD Candidate	University of Salzburg
	<i>Topic: "Empirical studies on the (strategic) value of information"</i>	
Since 05/2021	Research Assistant	University of Salzburg

Fields

Behavioral and Experimental Economics

Previous Academic Positions

02/2020 - 04/2021	Research Assistant	University of Vienna
09/2019 - 02/2020	Tutor (" <i>Quantification and Statistics</i> ")	University of Vienna
07/2019 - 09/2019	Research visit	MPI for Demographic Research

Education

10/2024 - 12/2024	Visiting PhD Student	University of Rotterdam
10/2018 - 03/2020	MSc in Economics <i>(with distinction & below regular duration)</i>	University of Vienna
10/2015 - 09/2018	BSc in Economics	University of Vienna

Grants and Presentations

09/2023	Presentation at the Austrian Economic Association's annual conference
12/2022	Graf Hardegg Foundation Research Grant

Languages German (native), English (excellent), Spanish (good), French, Chinese (beginner)

Software Skills R, LATEX (excellent), Python (advanced), SPSS, STATA (basic)

Personal Information Nationality: Austria

Part-time pianist/keyboardist

Work in Progress*“The Bayesian Chairman Paradox”*

(with Georg D. Granic and Alexander K. Wagner)

We study a model of strategic voting under uncertainty in a small committee with potentially conflicting preferences among the members, one of whom – the chair – has the power to break ties. Regular members have incomplete information about the chair’s preference type, which represents the information asymmetry typical for power imbalances. We investigate the effect of incomplete information and different priors on the translation of how formal power (the chair’s tie breaking power) into real power (whether the chair’s preferred option wins).

Applying iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS), we derive the Bayesian Nash Equilibria. Depending on the distribution of chair types, either the tie-breaking rule takes full effect and the chair’s preferred option wins, or the regular members coordinate against the chair. We test these predictions in an incentivized experiment with the beliefs as the treatment parameter (implemented through different commonly known distributions of chair types known to the participants).

We find that the participants exhibit behavior in line with the theoretical predictions to a remarkable extent. Their propensity to play optimally increases on average over time and is associated with higher levels of strategic sophistication and their ability to solve games using IEWDS, as elicited in additional experimental tasks. Crucially, the regular members’ beliefs determine which equilibrium is established and consequently whether chairs can use their tie-breaking power to push through their preferred option.

“Transmission of Private Information in a Sequential Demand Planning”

(with Daniel Garcia, Juha Tolvanen and Alexander K. Wagner)

We study a sequential demand planning problem where future demand for products is uncertain. We are interested in how private information held by the involved forecasters is transmitted and used for decision making. Analyzing real world data from a corporate sponsor using advanced econometric and statistical methods, we find that human forecasting performance is extremely poor as benchmarked against naïve univariate statistical methods, i.e. there is little evidence that forecasters’ private information contributes to the quality of forecasts.

Based on our findings, we build a model to explain the stylized facts we found in our empirical analysis, considering also behavioral biases of forecasters known from the behavioral economics literature. We then design and program an experiment where we test various treatment interventions to increase the efficiency of the information transmission from the human forecasters into the final forecast, also exploring the potential of artificial intelligence for information processing. An advantage of the experimental implementation is that we control the private information held by forecasters.

The evaluation of our interventions will provide guidelines for designing forecasting processes in the real world, as well as contribute to the literature on private information transmission and processing.